Copy of a Sham Reality

Photo: Andrei Shchukin - Kopia mnimoi realnosti

So the three of us should be ashamed. All this talk of re-launching the blog and the along comes final exams, new jobs, travels and everything else gets pushed to one side. But I thought I should comment on the video below that has been doing the rounds on the internet.

For those who haven’t yet seen this - an explanation. The Russian parliament, like, I imagine, many parliaments, suffers from a certain degree of absenteeism. Now I wouldn’t like to speculate what MPs do when they’re skiving from their official duties, but this time in the State Duma it’s rather what those who are present are doing that has caught everyone’s attention. It turns out that whilst Russian citizens thought that their MPs were unswervingly representing their interests they were in fact all along replaying their own childhood fantasies of being a contestant in the Crystal Maze, collecting as many golden tokens as possible before the time runs out. In other words, it’s possible that someone may be falsifying the vote.

What I want to dwell on here is not the levels of absenteeism in parliament, but the brazen manner in which MPs feel able to fix votes, on film, without a red face in sight (not talking about the drinking here), and with full complicity of the Vice-President of the Duma. In a land of extremes someone took the idea of voting on behalf of an absent friend just a little too far. Yes, in other countries MPs are also too busy travelling back and forth to the Canary Islands to be present for every little vote, but they don’t film themselves shamelessly perverting the course of democracy and then joking about it. The difference is all in the way you go about it. (Or is it? Is it better for politicians to openly show that they’re barefaced liars and good-for-nothings than to pretend that they’re not and us to know anyway?)

Maybe it’s the electronic voting system that’s at fault. Perhaps the Duma should consider regressing to the UK parliament-style of voting. President Medvedev thought that hi-tech buttons were part and parcel of his beloved “modernisation” drive when really he should have realised long back that shouting “aye!” louder than those shouting “nay!” and then having an old bloke in a black silk gown and optional knee breeches decide who wins is in fact the epitome of a flawless, foolproof, democratic voting system.

The law in question is President Medvedev’s pet project to lower the drink-drive limit; effectively reducing the amount of drinking you can do before legally driving to nil. This has created quite a furore. It turns out that Members of Parliament like to have a lunchtime tipple as much as the rest of us. Unlike in Britain, budget cuts won’t be soon forcing them to take platzkart from Krasnoyarsk when parliament is in session (or will they? That would be great). Furthermore, claims that drinking refreshing yet mildly alcoholic kvas or even eating black bread can be enough to push you over the limit have bolstered opposition to the law.

Some of my Russian friends claim that it has been scientifically proven that some people naturally have a certain amount of alcohol in their blood, even if they don’t drink. Naturally, I have had great fun winding them up about this. What was the alcohol level in the blood of the control group? “Are you sure you haven’t been drinking this morning Boris?” “Nyeeeet! Znachit, (hic) - it must be naturally occurring!” Russian scientists have proven a lot of things that my British brain has difficulty accepting. It’s like the time doctors diagnosed my friend’s recurring dizziness as a potential brain tumour, subjected him to a cocktail of drugs and brain scans for a fortnight before he went back to the UK and discovered he had a mild ear infection. But, really, digression over.

Whatever the dangers of bread-eating and driving may be, will a law like this actually do much to lower the number of deaths on Russia’s roads every year? Will reducing the permitted alcohol level from low to nil make people think twice about having two drinks instead of one, or will it just push more people “over the limit” and fatten the wallets of the gaishniki (traffic police known for their high moral qualities)?

And as I pointed out in a post last year, the problem is not always in the drinking. A closer look at the road traffic statistics for 2009 shows that of 203,603 road traffic accidents, 12,326 were caused by drunk drivers. As a result, 2,217 people were killed, out of a total of 26,084 deaths that year on the roads. This makes drunk drivers responsible for around 8% of deaths on the roads. To compare, 21,921 deaths were caused by sober drivers “not following the rules of the road” and 5098 were killed in accidents caused by “unsatisfactory road conditions” (seems to be some overlap in the statistics, but you get the idea). So is this yet again a case of politicians simply missing the mark?

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Medvedev and his Mistrals

This year is the year of Russia in France and France in Russia - an “année croisée”, marked by around 400 events in the political, economic and cultural spheres. As both a Russophile and a rosbif (won’t extend that to Francophile quite yet, sorry) studying on a Franco-Russian programme in Paris, Dmitri Medvedev’s 3-day official visit here this week should have been just my cup of tea.

“Operation Charm” was what Le Monde chose to call the Sarko/Dima schmooze-fest, referring to the abundance of PR companies on hand to promote Medvedev and his country in France and Europe. But who was trying to charm who more? A quick glance at the snippets of the press conference on TV and I wanted to shout “get a room!” as Sarkozy spieled: “I know, Mr President, the extent to which you have engaged yourself for modernising Russian society. […] Your attachment to a state with rule of law, respect for the law, judicial security and defence of human rights, very much facilitates the rapprochement between our two countries […] Russian culture, the Russian language, the Russian people need freedom. You are currently giving and building this freedom and modernity for them.”

Bleugh. Had the debate surrounding the level of continuity or rupture in the Russian political system with Medvedev’s coming to power eclipsed the French President? Or had someone forgotten to point out the figures that show that the largest number of refugees accepted by France every year for the past few years have been those persecuted and unable to benefit from the protection of their own state… Russia? And, wait a second - can it be that the French president’s memory is so weak that he forgot the circumstances surrounding his last visit to Moscow – to negotiate a certain ceasefire?

Some of us have a tendency to forget, though the prospect of the sale of four warships to Russia - a much-needed boost for France’s ailing military industry – obviously has memory-loss-inducing qualities. I should probably point out here that I am not making any judgement on the sale of the warships, but just the vomit-inducing diplomacy that is surrounding it. The whole situation is also rather interesting as many commentators have pointed out - the sale of the ships is the highpoint in the two-year about-turn in French-Russian diplomatic relations, smoothed out by PR whitewashing to sell Medvedev as the “new Gorbatchev”.

Around two years ago I wrote a university presentation on France’s diplomatic relations with Russia (amongst others). At that point, ten months into his presidency, Sarkozy, who had presented himself in the run up to the elections as the candidate for human rights, was having trouble staying true to his loudly-defended principles. Criticising countries that favoured contracts over defence for human rights he was meanwhile getting chummy with Colonel Kaddafi. Then he jumped to felicitate Medvedev with his presidential victory, (foreign minister Bernard Kouchner contented himself with the comment that the election figures were “very surprising, not quite Stalinist, but 70% ain’t bad!”).

And two years on Medvedev’s visit, with all it’s pomp and ceremony, shows how far the situation has evolved. Putin never forgave Sarkozy’s pre-election declarations: “It’s not because Russia is a superpower that we should prevent ourselves from denouncing human rights violations that are committed there”; “the France of human rights cannot be silent faced with the assassinations of journalists, with the 200,000 war dead in Chechnya; the time of realpolitik that crosses our humanitarian principles for contracts is over” (from Le Monde). But Medvedev is the perfect excuse for France to patch over relations – and (supposedly) save face. The new democratically reform-minded President ticks boxes both home and abroad – allowing Western countries, like France, to justify a rapprochement. This “western wishful thinking” that we spoke of back in October takes on another, more cynical tone – not only does Europe want to believe that Medvedev is one of the club, but it is also prepared to actively pedal the myth in an attempt to avoid criticism when business relations come into question. Meanwhile, the reality is that a big fat question mark still hangs over many aspects of the new Russian presidency - 2009 was the worst year in recent times for politically-motivated assassinations and what will come of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reforms is, at least at this stage, anyone’s guess.

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Whistle While You Work (If You Dare)

Artwork: 'Conversation' by Aleksandr Zhernokluev

Last November, Aleksei Dymovsky, a former Russian police officer from Novorossiik, publicly disclosed the widespread corruption that sits deep in the militsiia. His six-minute YouTube film has received over a million hits and caused quite a stir in Russia. These brave whistle-blowing tactics resulted unsurprisingly in his immediate dismissal from the police force, and last month, Dymovsky was arrested on fraud and corruption charges – revenge for his actions, some say. However, is there hope for this young policeman and others who want to disclose the dirty work of those entrusted with power?

Dymovsky’s bold but clumsy YouTube post has proven to be something of an inspiration. His arrest has led to a flourishing internet campaign, causing others to step forward in support and talk about their experiences of corruption. It would appear that this one whistleblower has lead to a newly assertive citizenry, unwilling to allow bribery and bullies triumph over integrity and truth…

Another hope for the battle against corruption lies with the Kremlin. President Medvedev has always vowed to address the issue more seriously and more concretely. Over the past year, several new federal laws have been introduced, namely ‘On Counteracting Corruption’. All these laws are based around Medvedev’s long-term national anti-corruption plan. In addition, the president’s State of the Nation Address last November pledged to stamp out this ugly problem. Surely there must be something of substance here?

As well as provoking an internet following, Dymovsky’s arrest has attracted much international media attention, forcing the rest of the world to address Russia’s appalling corruption record. Will lifting Russia’s shady profile onto the world stage shame the country’s leaders into addressing the situation properly?

However, neither Dymovsky’s case nor the battle for transparency is this simple. Although his arrest has inspired others to talk, this could be viewed simply as an online fad. The likelihood that Dymovsky will endure a long spell in Russia’s notoriously brutal prisons is simply going to deter others from speaking out in the long run. Many equate doing time in some of Russia’s worst prisons to a death sentence. The story of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who accused the Interior Ministry of corruption, died during a period of incarceration. Surely sometimes it’s better to sit down and shut up?

Furthermore, there is much criticism of the effectiveness of Medvedev’s grand anti-corruption plans. What has actually been achieved? Much of his electoral campaign prior to the 2008 victory was built upon promises to rid Russia of corruption and bring about change. However, as is seen all over the world, electoral promises do not always translate into policy. The death of Magnitsky and the arrest of Dymovsky are just two more chapters in the sad corruption saga that seems to have no denouement in sight.

It has also been pointed out that the successful media coverage of the case is nothing to celebrate. Since Dymovsky’s case converges with the Kremlin’s preferred policy of the month – championing the fight against corruption and reforming the Interior Ministry – the story has garnered much more interest and support than would otherwise have been the case.

What needs to be done?

Firstly, legislation protecting whistleblowers needs to be enforced. Future Dymovskys need to know that if they do speak out, they will not wind up in a prison cell.

Secondly, Messrs Medvedev and Putin need to act with true political will. As mentioned, anti-corruption policies are a vote-winner, but they need to be much more than this.

Thirdly, something must be done to alter the culture of tolerance that surrounds corruption in Russia. Last year, Caroline wrote an excellent post about university students achieving their grades by stuffing essays and exam papers with thousands of roubles. Even the young and intelligent are happy to buy their way through life, simply because this is the way that things are done in Russia.

This is not to say that Russians necessarily find corruption acceptable, but in order to survive and keep day-to-day living ticking over, people are prepared to put up with it. But how do you go about changing something that is so deep-rooted in daily life – the famous Russian byt’?


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Go, Russia! Or Just a Piece of Pie?

Much of the coverage of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s State of The Nation Address has been fairly negative. ‘We’ll believe it when we see it’ crowed the cynics. ‘Nice ideas, but what about specifics?’ challenged the journalists. Other commentators have insinuated that the address from the vertically-challenged orator was nothing more than a rambling piece of PR used to placate the Kremlin’s critics. But should we give his plans for modernisation a chance?

Although not the most scintillating of reads, the address is worth a quick glance. The speech tackles many of Russia’s serious problems, reaching out to the old, sick, poor, jobless and homeless. Medvedev placed an emphasis on the menace of alcoholism and the need to improve the country’s efficiency, a commitment that seemed to hark back to the good old days.

In addition to these unremarkable government pledges and a overly intense fixation with broadband (has the Russian president discovered a love of downloading?), Medvedev has promised to implement far-reaching reform by embracing free markets, stamping out corruption, denouncing Russia’s notorious state corporations, nurturing the growth of civil society, reforming the political system, strengthening democratic institutions and challenging the judicial system.

Phew. It appears that Medvedev has lot of work to do. The length of this list alongside vague phraseology and lack of time frames makes it easy to see why there has been a media backlash. The speech also focuses more on the ‘what’ and much less on the ‘how’, revealing gaps and weakness in his grand plan.

I feel sceptical for another reason; his words seem to say exactly what detractors want to hear, both within and beyond Russia’s borders. Medvedev even puts the words of his critics into his own mouth:

‘We must not simply be full of hot air, as they say.’

This kind of pandering suggests that Medvedev’s modernisation plans may only be superficial improvements in order to silence his critics whilst preserving the status quo. Jailbird Khodorkovskii has unsurprisingly voiced an opinion that highlights this problem. In response to the address he stated that it was simply a way to justify modernisation without bothering to dismantle Russia’s authoritarian system.

However, I do not believe that there is no room for optimism. The address was not totally devoid of specifics, but more importantly, the man holding the top seat in the Kremlin has stood up in front of the world and made a series of important, and in certain cases, embarrassing admissions. Criticising the USSR and talking of 'chronic backwardness' has not exactly been the norm in recent years. Such a public and honest acknowledgement of Russia’s afflictions and shortcomings should be welcomed, not simply pooh-poohed as another piece of Kremlin spin. The fact that the president has thrown these questions out into the open in such a disparaging way, whilst risking the wrath of his prime minister, is commendable.

In sum, this year’s State of The Nation Address is a step in the direction of reality, if not a genuine movement towards a comprehensive plan to adopt the reform so badly needed. The economic downturn has exposed Russia’s weaknesses – mainly its over-reliance on energy resources – and brought a much needed wake-up call, which has been articulated in this speech. Still, whether Medvedev plans to implement his promises once he has polished off his humble pie remains to be known.

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Good cop, bad cop: a sovereign tandemocracy

Image: Sinye Nosy

A Sunday afternoon in autumn pottering around at home. Or perhaps at the dacha. Time to relax, to reflect. What is on Dmitri Medvedev’s mind as he sits and sweats in the banya? Is he smugly chuckling at those stooopid political commentators who have been scrabbling over his every word this month after the publication of the article and a few other provocative hints let slip that he is making a move away from old Putin? Ho ho ho, keep fobbing the liberals off with words and in the meantime I can get away with anything! Or is he making a mental note to change his locks and get a restraining order out on some of his administration staff after making that scathing critique of Putinism and a bold assertion of his own power?

That same old mystery that has got everyone guessing for the past year has popped up again, namely: who’s really in charge in Russia? And now - is there a split between the gruesome twosome?

A popular theory in Russia of the power-sharing arrangement between the two men has been one of a “tandemocracy”, where Putin has consciously taken on the role of “bad cop”, leaving “good cop” Medvedev to show off his shiny liberalism. But what would explain some of Medvedev’s more harsh comments – his complete writing-off of the possibility anywhere in the near future of bringing back elections for regional governors, for example?

Dmitri Kamyshev, writing in Vlast’ magazine, points out that rather than simply a good cop/bad cop scenario, the current set up of power in Russia is in fact almost perfection of the American two-party system that the country has been striving for since the 1990s. Since attempts at raising an acceptable second party up to standard have failed, Russia has settled on replacing the two parties with two lone figures. And so “Party # 1” defends Putinism, whilst “Party # 2” criticises it: between them the tandem has occupied the positions of both ruler and opposition. This neatly keeps any criticism within the two-figure framework and, most importantly, allows them to define the key issues that neither side can criticise.

And these key issues are clearly stated in Medvedev’s “breakthrough” article when he emphasises the need for “cross-party consensus on strategic foreign policy issues, social stability, national security, the foundations of the constitutional order, the protection of the nation's sovereignty, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of property rights, the rejection of extremism, support for civil society, all forms of self-organisation and self-government.” When you put it like that there’s not much left for opponents to get their teeth into.

So what is it that is keeping us Westerners convinced that the doors of democracy in Russia are already ajar, and sooner or later to be thrown wide open? What is it that’s making us imagine the second image of Medvedev in the banya – the one of a man sweating it out to bring about the dawn of democracy?

Yuri Zarakhovich posting on the Jamestown foundation blog called the West’s reaction “liberal wishful thinking”. I think he’s hit the nail on the head. We want him to be the liberal saviour and we can’t get it into our democratic Western heads that there’s an entirely different mindset at play. We can’t quite understand that someone can use the same words – democracy, for example – and have in mind something rather different to what we want them to mean.

In comparison to Putin, Medvedev’s talking the talk and dressing the part. Put it this way: with Putin doing the evil spy eyes and the evil spy face in the background all the time Dima looks a darn sight more like someone you’d want to have drinks with in the hotel bar after a G8 summit. But these outward appearances have combined with our wishful thinking to lead us to get the wrong end of the stick. The Kremlin is probably patting itself on the back for this clever move: it turns out you can have a war with Georgia, chummy up with Iran, sell tanks to Chàvez, cut off gas to Ukraine and Europe, restart military exercises in European airspace and get everyone’s backs up over the Arctic and the Second World War and still get the West thinking your leader’s a closet liberal just by him being short, smiley, dressing smart cas and looking in Putin’s direction when things get a bit iffy.

Maybe I’m a sceptic, but I think if we try to image what is really going on in Medvedev’s mind on a lazy Sunday afternoon at the dacha it might help us snap out of this wishful thinking. He might be modern lawyer in a leather jacket, but he did not get to being President of the Russian Federation on his own. He might differ in style to the others, he might criticise where no-one has criticised before, but at the end of the day he’s a part and product of the same system. “I don’t think he cries himself to sleep at night because he can’t realise his democratic calling,” said one of my equally sceptic Russian friends. There’s an almost comforting thought.

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Poor Show in The Commons

Artwork: Claude Monet, "Houses of Parliament, London"

Last month I was invited to a discussion panel at the Houses of Parliament entitled Russia A Year On – Testing Medvedev’s Democratic Credentials. Having never been inside that elaborate building dominating the Thames, and as a fan of both democracy and Russia, I was pretty keen to attend.

The evening sunshine soaked the busy streets of London as I made my way through the heartland of British politics, dodging both tourists and traffic at Parliament Square. I was in good spirits and looking forward to a constructive debate. But the feeling did not last long past the moment that I entered Committee Room 11, where the panel was gathering. The event was oversubscribed, the bottle-green room was stuffy, attendees were tip-toeing not-so-subtly through the creaking door thirty minutes late, and those who were already sitting down were either texting away on their phones or kicking the back of my chair. Or so it seemed. But more importantly, the event turned out to be a no holds barred Russia-bashing session. And there was very little mention of either Medvedev or democracy.

The panel comprised of an exasperated Russian dissident, the hot-blooded prime minister of the resistance Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and two Western foreign policy experts. It was only the dissident who actually referred to the intended subject matter. Some interesting comparisons were made between the expectations of Medvedev’s supposed liberalism and those of past leaders. He concluded that with every new leader there has been renewed hope for a Western-friendly attitude, but every time this has ultimately proved to be a disappointment. I particularly enjoyed his reference to Andropov’s understandable fondness for whisky and jazz.

As valid as his points were, he was more of a downbeat entertainer than someone who could open up fresh debate. But because of his experiences (he was arrested and imprisoned for defending human rights in the 1960s and his application to run for the Russian Presidency was rejected in 2007), I found it hard to blame him for his cynicism. Nor did I blame the Chechen for his anger, having learnt what he had seen and experienced. But the attitude of the foreign policy buffs was another story. These were young, Western academics at the forefront of their field who should have taken the opportunity to lead a well-balanced discussion in order to make some progress in what sometimes seems to be the ‘inevitable’ confrontation between Russia and the West.

However, these two experts simply rehashed the same negative views about Russia, poorly justifying their opinions with unhelpful, sweeping comments such as ‘Russia refuses to co-operate’ and ‘Russia is dangerous’. Not only was this something that I had heard countless times before, but the speakers also made no attempt to propose what could or should be done to improve relations. Comments from the audience, which questioned Western policy towards Russia, were ungraciously slapped down. Such one-sided discussion serves no purpose other than to entrench mistrust in the West and hostility in Russia.

Certainly, Russia is far from perfect; it has many serious issues to address and the Georgia story has rightly provoked a wave of jittering. But if foreign policy experts working in think tanks and academic institutions continue to promote an attitude that smacks of Cold War divisions, then Russia will simply retreat further away from what is already a quasi-democracy and continue to regard the West with suspicion. Fortunately, there was someone last week who successfully managed to avoid such hackneyed rhetoric.

Although US President Barack Obama’s visit to Russia did not go down with the frenzy of hope and expectation as his presence has done elsewhere in the world, it was a positive step forward and one that should be emulated by all those dealing with Russia. His discussions with the Kremlin were positive, yet honest. He admitted and highlighted points of contention – namely the US proposed missile defence system – but made it clear that this would be worked around, as the issues of Georgia and NATO expansion will have to be. The summit converged on important areas of co-operation – nuclear warhead reductions, US transit to Afghanistan and combating terrorism – that can be built upon in the coming years and hopefully be used a basis to improve relations.

I honestly believe that Obama has it right here. There is little point trying to impose on Russia what we deem to be correct or right. The West needs to accept the differences and cope with them accordingly, but without selling out. Areas where interests do overlap must be emphasised and used as the point of departure for a relationship to be developed. Although it may not be for many years to come, the bitter aftertaste of the Cold War may finally be sweetened as co-operation progresses and the barriers of mistrust are broken down.

It simply serves no purpose whatsoever for us to discuss Russia in the terms that were used at the Houses of Parliament that June evening. However, an about-turn in the West will not be enough. Introspection from Russia is also necessary if genuine co-operation is to occur; many cite Obama’s cool reception as the result of anti-Western propaganda in Russia, which has only been exacerbated by the Kremlin pointing fingers at the US as the financial crisis has engulfed the world. A renewed relationship requires a change in attitude from both sides.

Perhaps these ideas are a little naïve and I know that many believe this summit will change nothing (and admittedly I do find Obama somewhat charming). But the Russian-Western partnership has failed over the last twenty years and it is certainly time to try a new, open, positive approach. And if we fail, at least we tried.

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Mr Medvedev

Art Work: Jose Maria Cano Photo: EFE/Sergei Chirikov
I went on a little jaunt last weekend to the wilds of the Russian countryside in search of bears, but alas my search was not very fruitful. Fortunately, my disappointment was curbed when I got home and found my news feed full of little tales about that other Russian bear-related character: Mr Dmitry Medvedev. I do like a good presidential story and here are some of the best from last week.

Why Women Love Medvedev

A recent survey by the “Social Opinion” foundation (FOM) has shown that Medvedev’s approval rating amongst women has risen by 10% over the last two months, giving him an overall 67% approval rate amongst the fairer sex. FOM put the question, “How do you think the president has changed over the past year” to women across the country, receiving amongst it’s replies, that: the head of government has “become more decisive” and “demanding”; “he has matured to become more competent”; “he is more active and business like” and some women even noted that his exterior appearance had changed. All in all, the consensus was that Putin’s protégée has grown up, at last adequately filling the presidential shoes. He might not have his prime minister’s good looks, but as political poster boy number two, Putin should start watching his back.

According to psychologist Sergei Makelov, the reasons for Medvedev’s increased popularity are quite obvious. “Most woman like an action-man type of character”, he told popular newspaper Argumenti i Fakti, “the kind, who is capable of solving any problem – or, at least claiming to be able to, since to the female ear the two are one and the same.” [whaaaat?] Apparently, Medvedev’s resolute pronouncements on education, healthcare and the ongoing struggle with wayward provincial bureaucrats have won him over the female electorate. Whether he follows his promises through remains to be seen, however, according to Makelov, this part of the bargain is not so important to women anyway. What a wonderful position for a politician to find himself in!

Mummy, I’ve Painted Medvedev

Over at Russian Livejournal (the place to blog in the Russian Federation), blogger fima-psuchopadt writes of a bumper-crop of children’s drawings that he has stumbled across, depicting respected Dmitry Anatolevich Medvedev himself. Now, I know traditionally Russians have always gone in for cult-building around its leaders (the proliferation of Lenin statues and Stalin's cult barely need mentioning here, although the tradition actually stretches back to Tsarist times) but in this day and age, I was a little surprised to learn that primary school children had been painting their president. Is this usual behaviour? (Side note: in the primary school I teach in there is a large picture of Dmitry Anatolevich over the door. Lovely stuff)

To return to fima-psuchopadt’s post, he has selected some of his favourite entrants amongst the art works, which he, somewhat ironically, sees as an uncanny representation of Russian truth, as depicted through childish eyes.


1. Medvedev frolicking past the three essential stages of a Russian's life: school, university,and, erm, Gazprom. As firma-psuchopadt points out, Medvedev is interestingly positioned so as either to be going backwards or leading a song and a dance on the spot. Uncannily indicative of the direction of Russian politics?






2.
“Medvedev Reads the Constitution to Children”. Apparently a wonderful example of respected Dmitry Anatolevich's greatness – note how even the cat and dog look upon the mighty president with rapt attention. However FP spots a bit of anti-state feeling in the over accurate attention to Medvedev’s diminished height and oversized tie knot.

That’s all on the weekend’s bear spotting, but there’s sure to be more soon.


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The Year of the Bear?

Photo: Sergei Maximishin

As he stepped into office exactly one year ago, few could have guessed the events that were in store with Dmitri Medvedev at the helm of Russia’s leadership. Many speculated about the possible changes within Russia and in her relations with others under a new, possibly liberal leader. Attentions were soon directed to the practicalities of the Putin-Medvedev tandem; who would take the leading role and was political conflict or instability in store? One year on and a question mark still hangs over many important questions. This week Russian Newsweek evaluated the power dynamic that has defined Medvedev’s first year in office.

Political commentators had a field day with Medvedev’s various antics a few weeks ago; first he was pardoning political prisoners, next he was giving an interview to the oppositionist “Novaia Gazeta”, then meeting with human rights defenders or liberal economic research centres. Overall it was certain comments made to Novaia Gazeta that got some fired up the most [read extracts from the interview on this blog here], with Medvedev declaring “I made this decision – and everyone else has to carry it out.” Did this mean that the young President had stepped out from under Putin’s shadow, defying his former master and the man he owes much of his career to, in order to take firm control of the country?

According to Russian Newsweek, things are not quite so clear cut. The above comments are indeed representative of Medvedev’s attitude towards state employees in general; they should simply come to work and do the tasks that are assigned to them, a far cry from the personal relationships favoured by Putin during his time as President. However, as a consequence many point out that Medvedev has failed thus far to surround himself with a close personal team such as that which Putin successfully created for himself whilst in power and retains to this day.

And these are just some of the reasons that Newsweek sees as indicating that Putin is making a comeback. As he was sworn into office, Medvedev started off promisingly, redoubling efforts to combat corruption and reform the judicial system. Yet any illusion of this “soft style” of rule being around to stay quickly faded with the August war in Georgia and the Ukrainian gas crisis. It was at this point that Medvedev slowly started to fade into the background and, as Newsweek points out, as the amendment to the constitution extending the presidential term was pushed through parliament it all became increasingly clear – Putin was back pulling the strings, and he was around to stay.

A quick look at the areas of competency of Prime Minister Putin; the country’s financial resources and key foreign policy decisions in Putin’s hands as well as control over aid to Russia’s regions and industry and the power to push forward initiatives such as that to amend the constitution, all begs us to ask the question: what is it that the President does? According to Newsweek’s enquiries, the truth of the matter all lies in initiatives.

Indeed much of the political manoeuvring in Russia of late has been on Medvedev’s initiative. Whether such initiatives have lived long enough to bear fruit however, is another matter. It was Medvedev who prompted the initiative of replacing numerous regional governors and mayors who have been rusting in their official positions for a good part of the past 20 years, yet only one of those on the list of those up for the chop was finally let go. Similarly, the anti-corruption package of measures proposed by the President was not passed through parliament until it had been severely modified. Medvedev’s power is thus limited to proposing reforms; with many of those executing his decisions reporting directly to the Prime Minister, the scope for the President’s orders to be carried out as he intends is restricted.

Moreover, in foreign policy Medvedev has his hands tied, Dmitri Trenin from the Russian Carnegie Centre told Newsweek. In order for him to make a decision, he has to go over the head of the Prime Minister, something that he is loathe to do given the potential conflicts, not to say embarrassments that could arise from such uncoordinated political assertiveness.

It seems therefore, that whilst Medvedev wants to assert himself, he wants to refrain from placing himself in direct opposition to Putin. As Newsweek reported last summer, in order to do so, Medvedev has been concentrating on areas that are further removed from Putin’s general domain, such as the judicial system. Accordingly, Medvedev’s reforms of the judiciary are part of his attempts to tease the courts out from under the influence of the siloviki [note: Russian politicians still in power often with a security services background] and in particular, the siloviki surrounding Putin. Moreover, sources close to Newsweek indicate that in creating an ever-increasing amount of Presidential Councils on various matters, Medvedev is conveniently avoiding the issue of having to pass his decisions past Putin. The Foreign Office, which, as do these Councils, reports directly to the President is similarly out of the Prime Minister’s reach.

Thus to some extent Medvedev’s attempts at scratching back some influence are beginning to pay off, albeit with some areas of confusion; the old rules are still in place whilst new ones are already in full swing which had lead to a degree of unpredictability in the system as a whole. Whilst the Putin and Medvedev tandem was previously careful to avoid any signs of contradiction between the two camps, having let their guard down conflicts are becoming increasingly apparent.

Yet Newsweek points out that despite the contradictions and difficulties, the Putin-Medevedev duumvirate seems to be in no danger of collapse. In fact, the situation seems to suit everyone. Putin is happy as he holds the reigns. Medvedev is happy as he gets some respite from the responsibilities of being President whilst still retaining all the privileges that come with such a post. If the situation does not change significantly, then despite Medvedev’s increasing confidence, he will still be prepared to step aside to allow Putin to become President again in 2012.
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You can read the original article upon which this is based here.

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Democracy has been, is, and will continue to be.

Artwork: Konstantin Latyshev: "Russia. Elections 2008. Kommunyaki Socialistovich Revengerov vs. Efesbee Kaygeebeeovich Spyov

Earlier this week President Medvedev gave his first interview to a Russian newspaper - his publication of choice seemed to be a significant one. He spoke fairly extensively with Dmitri Muratov, editor of Novaia Gazeta – one of the few papers in Russia to maintain a staunchly critical stance towards the Kremlin and an inquisitive nose for sensitive stories. Novaia Gazeta might not have a massive distribution in Russia, an interview might not change the world and the responses given by Medvedev may not have departed from the general rhetoric, but for the optimistic amongst us, pushing aside the plethora of potential ulterior motives, the very fact that Novaia Gazeta was granted this interview signals perhaps a start towards a more conciliatory era in relations between the state and the press.

I’ve picked out a few bits of the interview that I found the most interesting. You can read the full text (in Russian) here: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/039/01.html

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On the upcoming elections in Sochi – destination Winter Olympics 2012.

Muratov: Don’t you think perhaps it would be best to just cancel the elections in Sochi, rather than stage them? It would be less cynical to do so. Lebedev who was running for Mayor has been forced to step out of the race by the courts, whilst Nemtsov (also running) has been denied the chance to run his election campaign.

Medvedev: I don’t yet know who has been removed from the race or how, but I do know however, that at this moment in time there is a fully rigorous political battle going on in Sochi, and it is a good thing that there are representatives of various political groups taking part. In my opinion, the problem with many municipal elections is that they are too uniform – people don’t have anyone to choose from and find them dull.

On the social contract and presidential Council on civil society and human rights which took place on April 15th.

Muratov: Am I right in thinking that civil society is today more important to you than a society of government officials?

Medvedev: You know - civil society is something that we still haven’t entirely learned how to comprehend properly in Russia […]. But gradually we are beginning to understand that civil society is an integral social institution of any state. It is a feed-back institution; organisations of people who do not have a post in government or in the civil service, but who actively participate in the life of the country. […] I’d like to point out: such relations [between state and civil society] are never simple for any government. This is because civil society and representatives of human-rights organisations have many bones to pick with the state and the government. They want to ask a lot of questions; and one doesn’t always want to have to answer them. And this is precisely why such an exchange should be of an official nature - this is the aim of the Council. I am expecting that the discussion will be most interesting. Obviously, it will be tough. But this is precisely why it is important.

On the new law requiring civil servants and members of the government to declare their income.

Muratov: It has not really been made clear who it is that will be checking these declarations for their authenticity. It seems that over the past few days in Russia a powerful community of “impoverished” husbands with very affluent wives has appeared…

Medvedev: You know, the task of controlling the bureaucracy and government officials is one of the fundamental tasks of any state. We started doing this quite a long time ago and I can’t really say that we have had much success. Although if you were to compare with the situation in the 1990s and the situation today, I most definitely think that there has been an improvement. […] In my opinion, the main problem today is not the lack of normative acts on control, but lack of rigorous implementation of these acts. This is, of course, where the difficulty lies - because bureaucrats are never very satisfied when they are obliged to control themselves. However, these procedures must be followed despite the fact that no-one likes controlling themselves, no-one likes confining themselves within strict frameworks; they must be followed because this is what distinguishes a civilised society from an uncivilised one – a civilised society doesn’t like it, but it has learnt to do so all the same.

[…]

Muratov: Have you personally felt a negative reaction from bureaucrats? Or have they been understanding over your decision to enforce the publication of their declaration of income?

Medvedev: Well, you know, the post of president frees one of having to hear the negative reaction of bureaucrats. I made this decision – and everyone else has to carry it out.

On the independency of the judiciary and the Khordokovskii affair.

Muratov: I’d like to ask you about the second YUKOS trial. Did you find its outcome predictable? The outcome of the first trial, for anyone who took an interest in it, was, alas, rather predictable. Someone wrote in to me and said: perhaps in the beginning Medvedev is just going to ring up the courts, including that involved in the YUKOs trial and say “you’re independent, you’re independent, let me remind you, you’re independent, you’re independent, you’re independent! "And that will be a manual kick-start for the restoration of the judiciary system.

Medvedev: I can tell you now, that any manual kick-start is very costly and I’m not just talking about the courts system here. It is simply necessary to strive towards a state machine that works in a rational way automatically. [As for the YUKOs trial] perhaps the outcome of one or another trial someone found predictable. This is the freedom and the luckiness of a person who does not have state obligations.
[…]
However, whilst for everyone else, it’s a personal matter, it would be illegal for the president to find a court’s decision predictable. It would be a sign that the law has been broken. For civil servants and for the president there is not and should not be any inkling whatsoever of predictability of the outcome of any trial, and this includes the YUKOs trial.

On the regional authorities… and rumours

Muratov: In the city of Maiskii in Kabardino-Balkaria a rumour was doing the rounds that President Medvedev was soon coming to visit, since Medvedev’s grandmother lives somewhere in the region. And what did the local authorities do when they couldn’t find the said grandmother? Just in case, they re-laid all the roads in Maiskii; cleared out tonnes of rubbish; paved the main square; put up streetlamps; everyone was happy. Why don’t we spread rumours that Medvedev’s, Surkov’s or some other government ministers’ grandmothers live in various towns throughout Russia and perhaps the fear would make more local authorities come to their senses.

Medvedev: That’s quite a good technique… I can see what’s happened here. Once, in Maiskii, if I’m not mistaken, my grandfather worked as regional party secretary. This was 60 years ago however, but perhaps that’s where they’ve got it from.

On democracy in Russia.

Muratov: Today you’ve spoken about the elections, about control over bureaucrats, about the internet. Does this mean that President Medvedev is planning to rehabilitate democracy in Russia?

Medvedev: You know, I think that democracy in its own right is in no need for any kind of rehabilitation. Democracy is a historical notion and at the same time a wholly supranational one. Therefore democracy is not in need of rehabilitation anywhere. It’s another matter that for many of our citizens the very difficult political and, more importantly, economic upheavals of the 1990s at some point fused with the arrival of the first fundamental democratic institutes in our country. For these citizens these times were extremely difficult and this made a scar on their understanding of democracy. But this is just through personal experience, rather than their understanding of democratic institutions as a whole. Therefore I do not believe that we need to rehabilitate democracy. Democracy has been, is, and will continue to be.

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Successes of a Managed Democracy

Artwork: Konstantin Latyshev "GDP doubled"

Below are two articles that were published over the past fortnight, providing quite contradictory evaluations of the current political and economic situation in Russia today. The first is an editorial published in this week’s edition of “Expert”, a political economic magazine sympathetic to the Kremlin. It expresses the official line concerning events of Medvedev’s first year as President. The second article, also an editorial, was published a fortnight ago in “Nezavisimaia Gazeta” and casts any evaluation of Putin’s first year as Prime Minister in a rather different light.

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- Expert -
A Test of Stability

When Dmitri Medvedev won the presidential election on the 2nd March 2008, no one would have guessed how difficult his presidential term was to become. It looked like Medvedev would slowly yet surely continue the excellent developments initiated by Vladimir Putin, and set about fine-tuning those spheres, where noticeable results might have for whatever reason not been achieved.

In a pre-election speech in Krasnoyarsk, Dmitri Medvedev outlined some of his priorities: a significant degree of independence of the judicial system; completion of changes to administrative regulations; handing over certain government functions to the private sector. The main assertion of his speech sounded almost like an aphorism: “Freedom is better than non-freedom.” The plan for the economy was to lessen the tax burden and place the emphasis on “building an independent, powerful, yet open financial system.”

Life, however, made a few amendments of its own. Medvedev did not get an easy ride and he, just like Putin before him, had to first win a war in the Caucasus. The peace-enforcement mission in Georgia showed that Medvedev was a tough politician, capable of making difficult decisions, whilst the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement demonstrated his ability to succeed in rather precise diplomatic manoeuvres.

It was an unpleasant surprise for Moscow’s Western partners when Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet this was absolutely necessary in order to remove the threat to the republics of another attempt to end the dispute by force; an attempt that Tbilisi deemed inevitable after having lost the first war in August. The recognition of independence showed that Moscow is capable not only of reacting on the actions of its adversaries, but also of playing a deterring role. The Kremlin’s next step was to make yet another proposition to the US, EU and NATO about starting work on a new system of security for Europe, which would also take into account Russia’s interests. It is indeed rather showing that after the war our Western colleagues turned out to be much more susceptible to Moscow’s initiatives.

The ensuing economic crisis turned out to be an even bigger problem. A drop in the price of raw-material exports and a drain on capital subjected the Russian economy to a great shock. The rouble had to be devalued by almost a third, and cash reserves dropped by 36% (216 billion dollars). The events showed that the president was entirely right in his intentions to develop the country’s financial system, but that the crisis would make realising such plans significantly more difficult.

Political reforms were of utmost importance during Medvedev’s first year as president. The initiative to extend the presidential term to 6 years and the term for Duma deputies to 5 years was the proposition that attracted the most attention within society. However, under the current arrangement of the political system extending the terms would not have brought about any large changes, although it would have had a significant stabilising effect. Perhaps up until just a few months ago it seemed that there was even too much stability in Russia, so much, in fact, that reforms were unnecessary. However, as recent events have shown, such a backup plan would not have been for nothing.

The most significant changes with regards to the development of democratic procedures are those made to the appointment of regional governors (now only parties that have won in the regional elections will be allowed to present candidates), and also the changes to the procedure of forming the Federative Council (members will be chosen from elected deputies of the regional legislative assemblies). Additionally, moves have been made to encourage involvement of smaller parties in parliamentary affairs – those who did not obtain the minimum amount of votes, but received between 5 and 7 percent will now be represented. All in all, these steps should facilitate the development of a party system – all within the course that has been set out to make the transition towards a proportional election system.

Finally, we must also recognise the successful Medvedev – Putin duumvirate. The numerous speculations on the supposed division between the two leaders have remained for the time being just that – speculation. It is obvious, that however politically different Putin and Medvedev may be - they are two different people, and this will always result in differences in their views and approaches. But the differences are not that great.

Playing on disagreements between the president and prime minister it is a game that bureaucratic clans like to play; clans that see the existence of two decision-making centres as giving them the opportunity of attaining their own egoistic goals. And it is this game that during the global economic crisis Russia’s foes abroad would also very much like to play.
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- Nezavisimaia Gazeta -
The limits of the usefulness of “managed democracy”
Legislators are scared of asking the executive inconvenient questions

The state Duma (lower house of parliament) took three weeks to mull over the first report appraising the government under the leadership of Vladimir Putin’s “Edinaia Rossiia” (United Russia). On the 30th January an evaluation report undertaken by the ministerial cabinet and carried out as part of a presidential initiative was presented to the Duma by first deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. The result of the long reflection by parliamentarians on the content of this report was a ten page resolution.

The idea was that the state Duma would give a much needed evaluation of the anti-crisis policies of the government. There would be the opportunity to ask as many questions as needed during the meeting with the cabinet ministers. Then the Duma would take the report to bits and examine the Igor Shuvalov’s answers. This would be followed by an appraisal of the effectiveness with which measures that had been undertaken by the government. The plan was to then name those deemed guilty for the failure of any of the initiatives, whilst assigning certain figures the task of carrying out any urgent measures necessary to put the system to right.

However, the deputies did not set about asking difficult questions. The resolution that ensued confirmed the position of the parliamentary majority (United Russia): not one mistake committed by the ministerial cabinet was noted. Deputies got around the trickiest bit in their relations with the government with amazing simplicity. In order to answer the question “who’s guilty?”, whilst at the same time taking their own leader out of the equation, they thought up complex turns of phrase, with the only thing eventually criticised being the wholly abstract “insufficiently high level of discipline in many federal organs of executive power, resulting in bogging down of the timescale of carrying out the President and Prime Minister’s orders”.

And that was the end of the critical section of the Duma’s resolution. What followed were a series of requests made to the executive. Among them is the wholly astonishing remark expressing the need to organise and set up a government programme to encourage the unemployed to undertake work in the social sphere. That is, instead of demanding the government (and themselves for that matter) why on earth, a full half year into the crisis, such programmes do not already exist, deputies preferred to simply meekly express the desire of creating them. They did not even dare to mention the timeframe or name those who would be involved in their implementation.

It seems the deputies’ attitude can be summed up by the age-old saying “good Tsar, bad boyars”. It’s true, that there are now in fact two Tsars, but this is not important for state Duma deputies. It is much more important that the party leader receives the same respect as the president. However, the situation is not quite as amusing as it may seem.

Firstly, such a process devalues the very idea of an evaluation – what was the point of going to such trouble to produce a report just to end up making some insignificant suggestions to some insignificant people? Secondly, this trivialises the workings of the Duma. Tax-payers provide 5.5 billion roubles a year to keep the lower house of parliament running in the hope that its deputies will stand up for their interests, regardless of who they have to confront. Meanwhile, the majority of representatives are worried about only one thing - how to find sufficiently pleasant and inoffensive turns of phrase to describe the difficult relationship between the legislative and executive.

The problem is not just the declarational character of the Russian parliament. The problem is the removal from the political arena of one of the most important mechanisms of democratic control over the executive. It is necessary to have a real division of power not only on the surface, but in reality too. It has a practical use – improving the country’s anti-crisis programmes.

When times are tough, the natural limitations of a regime that calls itself “managed democracy” become plain to see. Sooner or later however the danger will arise that there will be no-one in this “democracy” left to govern.

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