Copy of a Sham Reality

Photo: Andrei Shchukin - Kopia mnimoi realnosti

So the three of us should be ashamed. All this talk of re-launching the blog and the along comes final exams, new jobs, travels and everything else gets pushed to one side. But I thought I should comment on the video below that has been doing the rounds on the internet.

For those who haven’t yet seen this - an explanation. The Russian parliament, like, I imagine, many parliaments, suffers from a certain degree of absenteeism. Now I wouldn’t like to speculate what MPs do when they’re skiving from their official duties, but this time in the State Duma it’s rather what those who are present are doing that has caught everyone’s attention. It turns out that whilst Russian citizens thought that their MPs were unswervingly representing their interests they were in fact all along replaying their own childhood fantasies of being a contestant in the Crystal Maze, collecting as many golden tokens as possible before the time runs out. In other words, it’s possible that someone may be falsifying the vote.

What I want to dwell on here is not the levels of absenteeism in parliament, but the brazen manner in which MPs feel able to fix votes, on film, without a red face in sight (not talking about the drinking here), and with full complicity of the Vice-President of the Duma. In a land of extremes someone took the idea of voting on behalf of an absent friend just a little too far. Yes, in other countries MPs are also too busy travelling back and forth to the Canary Islands to be present for every little vote, but they don’t film themselves shamelessly perverting the course of democracy and then joking about it. The difference is all in the way you go about it. (Or is it? Is it better for politicians to openly show that they’re barefaced liars and good-for-nothings than to pretend that they’re not and us to know anyway?)

Maybe it’s the electronic voting system that’s at fault. Perhaps the Duma should consider regressing to the UK parliament-style of voting. President Medvedev thought that hi-tech buttons were part and parcel of his beloved “modernisation” drive when really he should have realised long back that shouting “aye!” louder than those shouting “nay!” and then having an old bloke in a black silk gown and optional knee breeches decide who wins is in fact the epitome of a flawless, foolproof, democratic voting system.

The law in question is President Medvedev’s pet project to lower the drink-drive limit; effectively reducing the amount of drinking you can do before legally driving to nil. This has created quite a furore. It turns out that Members of Parliament like to have a lunchtime tipple as much as the rest of us. Unlike in Britain, budget cuts won’t be soon forcing them to take platzkart from Krasnoyarsk when parliament is in session (or will they? That would be great). Furthermore, claims that drinking refreshing yet mildly alcoholic kvas or even eating black bread can be enough to push you over the limit have bolstered opposition to the law.

Some of my Russian friends claim that it has been scientifically proven that some people naturally have a certain amount of alcohol in their blood, even if they don’t drink. Naturally, I have had great fun winding them up about this. What was the alcohol level in the blood of the control group? “Are you sure you haven’t been drinking this morning Boris?” “Nyeeeet! Znachit, (hic) - it must be naturally occurring!” Russian scientists have proven a lot of things that my British brain has difficulty accepting. It’s like the time doctors diagnosed my friend’s recurring dizziness as a potential brain tumour, subjected him to a cocktail of drugs and brain scans for a fortnight before he went back to the UK and discovered he had a mild ear infection. But, really, digression over.

Whatever the dangers of bread-eating and driving may be, will a law like this actually do much to lower the number of deaths on Russia’s roads every year? Will reducing the permitted alcohol level from low to nil make people think twice about having two drinks instead of one, or will it just push more people “over the limit” and fatten the wallets of the gaishniki (traffic police known for their high moral qualities)?

And as I pointed out in a post last year, the problem is not always in the drinking. A closer look at the road traffic statistics for 2009 shows that of 203,603 road traffic accidents, 12,326 were caused by drunk drivers. As a result, 2,217 people were killed, out of a total of 26,084 deaths that year on the roads. This makes drunk drivers responsible for around 8% of deaths on the roads. To compare, 21,921 deaths were caused by sober drivers “not following the rules of the road” and 5098 were killed in accidents caused by “unsatisfactory road conditions” (seems to be some overlap in the statistics, but you get the idea). So is this yet again a case of politicians simply missing the mark?

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Swedish Short Circuit

Image: Alexander Blosiak, openspace.ru

From IKEA’s Russian woes to maniacal cops on a deadly rampage, Andrei Loshak sees today’s Russia as a state of the absurd, a wonderland where Alice (the population) is up against the madness of the authorities. Both sides have been pushed to the edge, and both are beginning to snap.

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Extracts from the article “Short Circuited” by Andrei Lokshak, full original version available on openspace.ru, translation by me (sorry for any mistakes).

State of the Absurd

“We were born to bring Kafka to life,” has been a famous saying since Soviet times. Submerged in the absurd since childhood, we Russians have become experts in it. From our position on the other side of the looking glass, we manage to get by despite it. And it’s only Europeans, with their tiresome rationalism, that arrive in Russia and immediately start trying to find a comprehensible logic in what is happening. But in the end most of them get used to the way things work here and some of them even start to obey the laws of etiquette that require that the cake is shared out, and then sliced up – the laws of the other side of the looking glass – Russian wonderland.

The Russian branch of IKEA is a perfect example. IKEA declared from the outset that even in Russia it intended to unwaveringly uphold its clear Swedish rules, based on a protestant work ethic and strict logistics. As a result, before the opening of IKEA’s first store in Moscow the local authorities cut off its electricity supply. For no practical reason whatsoever – just in order to “rough up” the company as payback for its excessive integrity. Ever since, the Swedes knew their stores were going to be needing their own generators and have tried to do everything in order to depend as little as possible on the mood of the local authorities. The store in Samara built three years ago has proven more problematic - the opening has been postponed nine times. IKEA, a company that has launched 230 stores around the world, just couldn’t break through the unflinching greed of the Samaran bureaucrats, whose last issue in a long line of grievances was that the building was “insufficiently hurricane-proof”. The Swedes, lacking any information about the destructive tornadoes that wreak devastation on the left bank of the Volga, finally took offence. The legendary founder of the company Ingvar Kamprad declared that investments in Russia would be curtailed. But it’s doubtful that such a scare will have any effect on local bureaucrats. For they act not in their own greedy interests. They support the normal functioning of an irrational system.

A few months later another blow was in line for Kamprad. It turned out that in using the generators – the idea that IKEA was so proud of – the company overpaid 200 million dollars, which practically reduced the profits of the whole eastern European division of the company over the past few years to zero. The Swedes thought themselves such Lancelots, having cut off the head of the dragon of corruption, but had forgotten that according to the laws of wonderland a new head quickly sprouts. An official investigation revealed that the Russian IKEA employee responsible for renting the generators had been receiving a cut from the leasers and had been significantly raising the cost of their services. IKEA cut its contract with this firm and as a result was fined another 5 million euros by the Russian courts for breaking the conditions of contract.

Then – the final blow. A couple of weeks ago the Swedish tabloids revealed that the director of IKEA for Russia and Eastern Europe, Per Kaufmann, famous for his public criticism of Russian corruption, had been turning a blind eye to evidence of backhanders being made to contractors of the regional administration. Kamprad stayed true to his principles and immediately sacked Kaufmann, who had been his closest colleague for the past 20 years. He admitted defeat. Maybe for the first time in his life. The Swedes repeated the mistake of land surveyor K in Kafka’s “The Castle”, who tried to conquer the absurd by the strength of reason. It turned out to be a crazy plan. The possibilities of reason are limited, but the absurd knows no boundaries.

Operating system

Corruption is irrational, as its very existence is deadly for a state. This is precisely why it ideally suits a state of the absurd, and is its operating system. The survival strategy for those living in such a state is not to look for the sense in anything. For those who dare attempt it, a glace at the Russian newsreel quickly turns into a psychedelic bad trip. A person will experience a cascade of dazzling negative emotions: fear, horror, shock, indignation, but meanwhile cannot find any logic: “Managers of the state bank VTB pulled off fraud, stole from the state and shareholders millions of dollars. One person has been fired.” , “Commander of the airborne forces of Russia General Shamanov will not be brought to trial due to no crime having taken place. The General tried to obstruct the work of a police investigator who was investigating a case concerning the General’s father in law, a criminal heavyweight who goes by the name of “Glyb”, for whom an international search warrant has been issued. The General called upon two squadrons of the air force special task force to deal with the police officer. The case has been closed because, as Shamanov himself explained, he later personally called off the order to capture the investigator."

It is the most Orwellian oxymora heard from the highest levels that are the final straw in the waves of paradoxical information and are enough to drive you insane: “conservative modernisation”, “sovereign democracy”, “parliament is not the place for discussions”. Such apparent contradictions are regularly thrown at our consciousness and heighten the feelings of disorientation and existential weightlessness which lead to a person being prepared to accept any information from above, however monstrous and contradictive it may be. As a result no one is even mildly surprised to hear that United Russia has won 102% in the elections. For what could surprise a nation where the title of main liberal democrat has been held by Vladimir Zhirinovsky for the past 20 years? The most ominous oxymoron of our time? “Law enforcement authorities”, in other words - organised crime. But, as strange as it may seem, it is precisely the police, in pushing the limits of moral decay, who can save the country. At some point in time the absurd, when it reaches critical proportions, transforms into outright nonsense, that is - utter insanity.

The State vs. the People

The turning point came with the massacre committed by Major Evsyukov. The shooting of shoppers in the supermarket didn’t just contradict common sense – it was devoid of it whatsoever. It was just after this massacre that the law enforcement went on the offensive against its own people. Every day we now hear about how someone in uniform has killed, robbed, run over in a car, or violated someone. For me, personally, what topped this all off was Evsyukov’s court case: “Former officer of the criminal investigation department of the district department of internal affairs Roman Potemkin, who participated in the arrest of Evsyukov, took a stand as witness. Potemkin was brought to court in handcuffs as he himself has been under investigation for extortion since October.” The collapse of the law enforcement system has actually already begun.

As is often the case, in the individual insanity of Evsyukov there was also the cast-iron logic of social processes. The system had to go mad. National security services in a healthy state, as Lenin once wrote, are steamrollers, unquestioningly carrying out the commands from above. As machines do not have and should not have brains, and commands are not given to them every day, their daily life is strictly regulated by instructions and rules. A malfunctioning occurs when commands from their owner dramatically contradict the rules of their maker. A short circuit occurs that causes over 2 million evil robocops to unleash terror against the civilians.

It’s strange – did the ruling elite really seriously assume that the law could be broken selectively? That whilst some carve up, squeeze dry, racketeer and topple the country, others, like complete idiots, will start to honestly carry out their duties under the social contract? This lie, taken to the absurd, has infiltrated the state apparatus from the top to the bottom, poisoned the heads of the junior and middle-ranking personnel. Our police force is now a massive army of bad lieutenants, ready at any moment to turn into insane majors.

People vs. the State

When the absurd grew into insanity the system hit the self-destruct command. The impenetrable fortress started to crumble from within. The eagle’s two heads are tearing one another to pieces and feathers are flying. But here’s the strange thing: the direr the state entropy, the faster everything falls apart and the easier it is to breathe. It’s as if there is now more air. I think that fear in society has disappeared. In the inability of the authorities to control their own kind the people have seen weakness. Such a state cannot have power to repress. The wild bites of the crazed system brought people out of their hypnosis. In the place of fear and apathy has come anger.

Mikhail Bakunin once wrote “Nothing is more dangerous for man’s private morality than the habit of command”. When the authorities start to degrade, you want to be higher than them, to counter cynicism with dignity, moral degradation with composure and humanity. The philosopher Murray Bookchin called this “self-organised reconstruction of society”. The vestiges of this process are already observable. Whereas before people only participated in public rallies when the bulldozers were already driving up to their house, now expressing protest has almost become fashionable. People have started standing up for one another. A couple of weeks ago a drunken police officer in a Mercedes ran over a woman standing at a bus stop. How did the officials act? The cop driving was incapable of stringing two words together; the man in uniform next to him hopped out of the car and ran off. Then their colleagues from the district department of internal affairs turned up and together with the road traffic police tried to sweep it all under the rug. How did people act? Three top bank managers who happened by chance to have seen the accident gave the woman first aid, called an ambulance, and when they noticed that the number plate was being unscrewed from the car, they called some journalists. It was only thanks to the noise they made over the matter that the public prosecutor found out about what happened. A scandal broke out. Heads went flying again (as if in their place new ones aren’t going to grow). A small victory was won over the system. The idea that a people deserves the government it has is a foul lie. At moments of great difficulty, simple people who have not been maimed by the “habit of command” don’t tear at each other’s throats, but hold out a hand of help.

As soon as the “steamroller” stops inspiring fear, out comes the age-old opposition of the Russian people to the state. The philosopher Berdiaev wrote, “Russia is the most un-governable country in the world. Anarchism is a characteristic of the Russian soul, it has been inherent in different ways both in the extreme left and the extreme right. Both the Slavophiles and Dostoevsky are also, essentially, anarchists like Bakunin, Kropotkin, or Tolstoy.” All imperialists and supporters of sovereign power in Russia are enemies of the people – and history just goes to show this. Our interests are diametrically opposed, “when the state gets stronger the people feebler” was the reverse dependency observed long ago by Kliuchevsky. Nothing has changed since. The popular teenage band “Lumen” sings, “I love my country so much, but I hate the State”. You couldn’t put it any better.

The most interesting thing is that those who work for the state are also anti-state in spirit. Just try talking to any cop or civil servant off the record. You’ll find more deception and cynicism than the classicists could ever have dreamed of. And the ruling elite similarly hides under patriotic rhetoric whilst carrying out its daily ritual of the absurd. As soon as the time comes they’ll scarper to Antibes and Marbella. They say that the Prime Minister’s daughters live in either Germany or Switzerland. In any case, not in Russia, that’s for sure. He’s no enemy to his own children.

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Medvedev and his Mistrals

This year is the year of Russia in France and France in Russia - an “année croisée”, marked by around 400 events in the political, economic and cultural spheres. As both a Russophile and a rosbif (won’t extend that to Francophile quite yet, sorry) studying on a Franco-Russian programme in Paris, Dmitri Medvedev’s 3-day official visit here this week should have been just my cup of tea.

“Operation Charm” was what Le Monde chose to call the Sarko/Dima schmooze-fest, referring to the abundance of PR companies on hand to promote Medvedev and his country in France and Europe. But who was trying to charm who more? A quick glance at the snippets of the press conference on TV and I wanted to shout “get a room!” as Sarkozy spieled: “I know, Mr President, the extent to which you have engaged yourself for modernising Russian society. […] Your attachment to a state with rule of law, respect for the law, judicial security and defence of human rights, very much facilitates the rapprochement between our two countries […] Russian culture, the Russian language, the Russian people need freedom. You are currently giving and building this freedom and modernity for them.”

Bleugh. Had the debate surrounding the level of continuity or rupture in the Russian political system with Medvedev’s coming to power eclipsed the French President? Or had someone forgotten to point out the figures that show that the largest number of refugees accepted by France every year for the past few years have been those persecuted and unable to benefit from the protection of their own state… Russia? And, wait a second - can it be that the French president’s memory is so weak that he forgot the circumstances surrounding his last visit to Moscow – to negotiate a certain ceasefire?

Some of us have a tendency to forget, though the prospect of the sale of four warships to Russia - a much-needed boost for France’s ailing military industry – obviously has memory-loss-inducing qualities. I should probably point out here that I am not making any judgement on the sale of the warships, but just the vomit-inducing diplomacy that is surrounding it. The whole situation is also rather interesting as many commentators have pointed out - the sale of the ships is the highpoint in the two-year about-turn in French-Russian diplomatic relations, smoothed out by PR whitewashing to sell Medvedev as the “new Gorbatchev”.

Around two years ago I wrote a university presentation on France’s diplomatic relations with Russia (amongst others). At that point, ten months into his presidency, Sarkozy, who had presented himself in the run up to the elections as the candidate for human rights, was having trouble staying true to his loudly-defended principles. Criticising countries that favoured contracts over defence for human rights he was meanwhile getting chummy with Colonel Kaddafi. Then he jumped to felicitate Medvedev with his presidential victory, (foreign minister Bernard Kouchner contented himself with the comment that the election figures were “very surprising, not quite Stalinist, but 70% ain’t bad!”).

And two years on Medvedev’s visit, with all it’s pomp and ceremony, shows how far the situation has evolved. Putin never forgave Sarkozy’s pre-election declarations: “It’s not because Russia is a superpower that we should prevent ourselves from denouncing human rights violations that are committed there”; “the France of human rights cannot be silent faced with the assassinations of journalists, with the 200,000 war dead in Chechnya; the time of realpolitik that crosses our humanitarian principles for contracts is over” (from Le Monde). But Medvedev is the perfect excuse for France to patch over relations – and (supposedly) save face. The new democratically reform-minded President ticks boxes both home and abroad – allowing Western countries, like France, to justify a rapprochement. This “western wishful thinking” that we spoke of back in October takes on another, more cynical tone – not only does Europe want to believe that Medvedev is one of the club, but it is also prepared to actively pedal the myth in an attempt to avoid criticism when business relations come into question. Meanwhile, the reality is that a big fat question mark still hangs over many aspects of the new Russian presidency - 2009 was the worst year in recent times for politically-motivated assassinations and what will come of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reforms is, at least at this stage, anyone’s guess.

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Good cop, bad cop: a sovereign tandemocracy

Image: Sinye Nosy

A Sunday afternoon in autumn pottering around at home. Or perhaps at the dacha. Time to relax, to reflect. What is on Dmitri Medvedev’s mind as he sits and sweats in the banya? Is he smugly chuckling at those stooopid political commentators who have been scrabbling over his every word this month after the publication of the article and a few other provocative hints let slip that he is making a move away from old Putin? Ho ho ho, keep fobbing the liberals off with words and in the meantime I can get away with anything! Or is he making a mental note to change his locks and get a restraining order out on some of his administration staff after making that scathing critique of Putinism and a bold assertion of his own power?

That same old mystery that has got everyone guessing for the past year has popped up again, namely: who’s really in charge in Russia? And now - is there a split between the gruesome twosome?

A popular theory in Russia of the power-sharing arrangement between the two men has been one of a “tandemocracy”, where Putin has consciously taken on the role of “bad cop”, leaving “good cop” Medvedev to show off his shiny liberalism. But what would explain some of Medvedev’s more harsh comments – his complete writing-off of the possibility anywhere in the near future of bringing back elections for regional governors, for example?

Dmitri Kamyshev, writing in Vlast’ magazine, points out that rather than simply a good cop/bad cop scenario, the current set up of power in Russia is in fact almost perfection of the American two-party system that the country has been striving for since the 1990s. Since attempts at raising an acceptable second party up to standard have failed, Russia has settled on replacing the two parties with two lone figures. And so “Party # 1” defends Putinism, whilst “Party # 2” criticises it: between them the tandem has occupied the positions of both ruler and opposition. This neatly keeps any criticism within the two-figure framework and, most importantly, allows them to define the key issues that neither side can criticise.

And these key issues are clearly stated in Medvedev’s “breakthrough” article when he emphasises the need for “cross-party consensus on strategic foreign policy issues, social stability, national security, the foundations of the constitutional order, the protection of the nation's sovereignty, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of property rights, the rejection of extremism, support for civil society, all forms of self-organisation and self-government.” When you put it like that there’s not much left for opponents to get their teeth into.

So what is it that is keeping us Westerners convinced that the doors of democracy in Russia are already ajar, and sooner or later to be thrown wide open? What is it that’s making us imagine the second image of Medvedev in the banya – the one of a man sweating it out to bring about the dawn of democracy?

Yuri Zarakhovich posting on the Jamestown foundation blog called the West’s reaction “liberal wishful thinking”. I think he’s hit the nail on the head. We want him to be the liberal saviour and we can’t get it into our democratic Western heads that there’s an entirely different mindset at play. We can’t quite understand that someone can use the same words – democracy, for example – and have in mind something rather different to what we want them to mean.

In comparison to Putin, Medvedev’s talking the talk and dressing the part. Put it this way: with Putin doing the evil spy eyes and the evil spy face in the background all the time Dima looks a darn sight more like someone you’d want to have drinks with in the hotel bar after a G8 summit. But these outward appearances have combined with our wishful thinking to lead us to get the wrong end of the stick. The Kremlin is probably patting itself on the back for this clever move: it turns out you can have a war with Georgia, chummy up with Iran, sell tanks to Chàvez, cut off gas to Ukraine and Europe, restart military exercises in European airspace and get everyone’s backs up over the Arctic and the Second World War and still get the West thinking your leader’s a closet liberal just by him being short, smiley, dressing smart cas and looking in Putin’s direction when things get a bit iffy.

Maybe I’m a sceptic, but I think if we try to image what is really going on in Medvedev’s mind on a lazy Sunday afternoon at the dacha it might help us snap out of this wishful thinking. He might be modern lawyer in a leather jacket, but he did not get to being President of the Russian Federation on his own. He might differ in style to the others, he might criticise where no-one has criticised before, but at the end of the day he’s a part and product of the same system. “I don’t think he cries himself to sleep at night because he can’t realise his democratic calling,” said one of my equally sceptic Russian friends. There’s an almost comforting thought.

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A Serious Move from Lukashenka?

Aliaksandr Lukashenka

Another day, another provocative comment from Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka. On Thursday he announced to the world that the Russia Belarus Union is an ‘incomplete project’ and should be shelved. He confirmed that he would like to establish trade links with the US and that he is seeking further co-operation with the EU, as reported in the Russian newspaper, Kommersant. This comes after a somewhat dubious outburst a couple of months ago following a bitter spat over a loan instalment. Lukashenka then claimed that Belarus would have to try its luck in other parts of the world if things didn’t work out with Russia. Thursday’s comment, however, gives more reason to think that Lukashenka is actually serious about making concessions to the West.

Following the squabble over the loan and the subsequent ‘dairy war’ it could be said that Lukashenka’s proclamations were little more than an effort to get noticed by the international community. Belarus is neither politically nor economically prepared to integrate with the West despite its promising, albeit cosmetic, democratic makeover. There is also good reason for both Russia and Belarus to continue co-operating despite the limp state of the union, namely Belarusian dependency and Russia’s enjoyment of a buffer to the ever-encroaching NATO. Furthermore, Belarus is an important energy transit country whilst Nord Stream remains a project on paper. For the time being, it seems like these squabbling brothers will have to like it or lump it.

However, there appears to be more weight backing up Lukashenka’s latest attempt to woo the West. Last year, the Belarusian government refused to tow the line following the war in Georgia and did not recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. This indeed seemed like a very bold – and also brave – step away from Russia. Alongside Thursday’s announcement, Lukashenka pushed this highly sensitive issue further by telling Belarusian citizens not to enter the Georgian enclaves via the Russian border.

Although once again this has served Lukashenka’s aim of achieving international press coverage, it really does show that he wants to establish ties with the West. Georgia remains one of the most important obstacles in the way of Russian/Western co-operation and if Lukashenka insists on sticking his oar into the somewhat heated debate, then he is certainly taking his chances by rubbing the Russians up the wrong way. Other more credible evidence of steps towards the West include the release of a US lawyer from prison at the end of last month and an official pardon from the Belarusian government.

But why would a small-town dictator want to pander to the West? After all, he secures his leadership election after election using highly undemocratic methods and yet still enjoys popularity amongst a substantial amount of Belarusian citizens. Other than the fact that Russia is beginning to look untrustworthy following the milk disputes and the loan squabble, Lukashenka has realised that total dependence on Russia is a strategically unsound option.

This is particularly evident with regards to energy following the 2006/7 gas dispute. It is clear that Belarus is keen to diversify its energy supplies away from Russia, shown by plans to build a nuclear power plant. However, it is ironic that Lukashenka has asked for the $9 billion loan to pay for the plant from exactly those whom he is trying to lessen his dependency on; the Kremlin. The desire to diversify has also been shown by the claim that Belarus wants to start trading with the US. A nice idea, but Belarus will have to start producing something that the US actually wants to buy. Nevertheless, the Belarusian leader has identified an important area of weakness and is setting about rectifying this through his concessions to the West.

So, for arguments sake, let’s say that Lukashenka is serious. He’ll make democratic reforms. He’ll stop being a megalomaniac. He’ll release political prisoners and shake up the economy. But should the West trust him? Can a dictator really shave off his moustache overnight? The constitution still states that Lukashenka can run for presidency indefinitely. It is still highly unlikely that the West will embrace Lukashenka, but will simply welcome the move and try to encourage democratic reform with a series of promises of economic help.

And how will those on Belarus’ eastern border react? It is reasonable to think that many Russian politicians will be glad to see the back of this parasitic embarrassment. However, the Belarusian government seems keen to maintain ties and it is also likely that Russia will want to keep a working relationship ticking over. Lukashenka stressed that co-operation with the West was not to be developed at the expense of relations with Russia. Lukashenka is hedging his bets; he wants to lessen his dependency on Russia, but realises that he still needs their help – financially more than anything.

But one shouldn’t knock him too much for such a move. He is simply being realistic; Minsk needs to emerge from its isolationist state, but links with Moscow are too important to make a break. However, Lukashenka seems to think that the only way to please the West is to display animosity towards Russia; the instruction concerning travel to the Georgian enclaves has provoked outrage in Moscow. If he still wants to keep receiving his billion dollar loans, then Lukashenka will have to tread more carefully.

The move should be welcomed, but with caution. Much more needs to be done to improve the state of Belarusian politics and Lukashenka could be in danger of deepening dividing lines if he continues to aggravate the Kremlin. But if making concessions to the US and the EU can invigorate Belarus through increased trade, a more diverse economy and democratic reform, then it will be the people of Belarus who should ultimately reap the benefits. Opening up to the West will also hopefully mean that more aid will be directed to Belarus and those who need the help of the international community – particularly Chernobyl victims.

It would be even better if Lukashenka were to move on, and a trustworthy, democratic reformist were to take care of this oft-forgotten and economically stunted country. However, this really is the stuff of dreams.

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Poor Show in The Commons

Artwork: Claude Monet, "Houses of Parliament, London"

Last month I was invited to a discussion panel at the Houses of Parliament entitled Russia A Year On – Testing Medvedev’s Democratic Credentials. Having never been inside that elaborate building dominating the Thames, and as a fan of both democracy and Russia, I was pretty keen to attend.

The evening sunshine soaked the busy streets of London as I made my way through the heartland of British politics, dodging both tourists and traffic at Parliament Square. I was in good spirits and looking forward to a constructive debate. But the feeling did not last long past the moment that I entered Committee Room 11, where the panel was gathering. The event was oversubscribed, the bottle-green room was stuffy, attendees were tip-toeing not-so-subtly through the creaking door thirty minutes late, and those who were already sitting down were either texting away on their phones or kicking the back of my chair. Or so it seemed. But more importantly, the event turned out to be a no holds barred Russia-bashing session. And there was very little mention of either Medvedev or democracy.

The panel comprised of an exasperated Russian dissident, the hot-blooded prime minister of the resistance Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and two Western foreign policy experts. It was only the dissident who actually referred to the intended subject matter. Some interesting comparisons were made between the expectations of Medvedev’s supposed liberalism and those of past leaders. He concluded that with every new leader there has been renewed hope for a Western-friendly attitude, but every time this has ultimately proved to be a disappointment. I particularly enjoyed his reference to Andropov’s understandable fondness for whisky and jazz.

As valid as his points were, he was more of a downbeat entertainer than someone who could open up fresh debate. But because of his experiences (he was arrested and imprisoned for defending human rights in the 1960s and his application to run for the Russian Presidency was rejected in 2007), I found it hard to blame him for his cynicism. Nor did I blame the Chechen for his anger, having learnt what he had seen and experienced. But the attitude of the foreign policy buffs was another story. These were young, Western academics at the forefront of their field who should have taken the opportunity to lead a well-balanced discussion in order to make some progress in what sometimes seems to be the ‘inevitable’ confrontation between Russia and the West.

However, these two experts simply rehashed the same negative views about Russia, poorly justifying their opinions with unhelpful, sweeping comments such as ‘Russia refuses to co-operate’ and ‘Russia is dangerous’. Not only was this something that I had heard countless times before, but the speakers also made no attempt to propose what could or should be done to improve relations. Comments from the audience, which questioned Western policy towards Russia, were ungraciously slapped down. Such one-sided discussion serves no purpose other than to entrench mistrust in the West and hostility in Russia.

Certainly, Russia is far from perfect; it has many serious issues to address and the Georgia story has rightly provoked a wave of jittering. But if foreign policy experts working in think tanks and academic institutions continue to promote an attitude that smacks of Cold War divisions, then Russia will simply retreat further away from what is already a quasi-democracy and continue to regard the West with suspicion. Fortunately, there was someone last week who successfully managed to avoid such hackneyed rhetoric.

Although US President Barack Obama’s visit to Russia did not go down with the frenzy of hope and expectation as his presence has done elsewhere in the world, it was a positive step forward and one that should be emulated by all those dealing with Russia. His discussions with the Kremlin were positive, yet honest. He admitted and highlighted points of contention – namely the US proposed missile defence system – but made it clear that this would be worked around, as the issues of Georgia and NATO expansion will have to be. The summit converged on important areas of co-operation – nuclear warhead reductions, US transit to Afghanistan and combating terrorism – that can be built upon in the coming years and hopefully be used a basis to improve relations.

I honestly believe that Obama has it right here. There is little point trying to impose on Russia what we deem to be correct or right. The West needs to accept the differences and cope with them accordingly, but without selling out. Areas where interests do overlap must be emphasised and used as the point of departure for a relationship to be developed. Although it may not be for many years to come, the bitter aftertaste of the Cold War may finally be sweetened as co-operation progresses and the barriers of mistrust are broken down.

It simply serves no purpose whatsoever for us to discuss Russia in the terms that were used at the Houses of Parliament that June evening. However, an about-turn in the West will not be enough. Introspection from Russia is also necessary if genuine co-operation is to occur; many cite Obama’s cool reception as the result of anti-Western propaganda in Russia, which has only been exacerbated by the Kremlin pointing fingers at the US as the financial crisis has engulfed the world. A renewed relationship requires a change in attitude from both sides.

Perhaps these ideas are a little naïve and I know that many believe this summit will change nothing (and admittedly I do find Obama somewhat charming). But the Russian-Western partnership has failed over the last twenty years and it is certainly time to try a new, open, positive approach. And if we fail, at least we tried.

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Democracy has been, is, and will continue to be.

Artwork: Konstantin Latyshev: "Russia. Elections 2008. Kommunyaki Socialistovich Revengerov vs. Efesbee Kaygeebeeovich Spyov

Earlier this week President Medvedev gave his first interview to a Russian newspaper - his publication of choice seemed to be a significant one. He spoke fairly extensively with Dmitri Muratov, editor of Novaia Gazeta – one of the few papers in Russia to maintain a staunchly critical stance towards the Kremlin and an inquisitive nose for sensitive stories. Novaia Gazeta might not have a massive distribution in Russia, an interview might not change the world and the responses given by Medvedev may not have departed from the general rhetoric, but for the optimistic amongst us, pushing aside the plethora of potential ulterior motives, the very fact that Novaia Gazeta was granted this interview signals perhaps a start towards a more conciliatory era in relations between the state and the press.

I’ve picked out a few bits of the interview that I found the most interesting. You can read the full text (in Russian) here: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/039/01.html

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On the upcoming elections in Sochi – destination Winter Olympics 2012.

Muratov: Don’t you think perhaps it would be best to just cancel the elections in Sochi, rather than stage them? It would be less cynical to do so. Lebedev who was running for Mayor has been forced to step out of the race by the courts, whilst Nemtsov (also running) has been denied the chance to run his election campaign.

Medvedev: I don’t yet know who has been removed from the race or how, but I do know however, that at this moment in time there is a fully rigorous political battle going on in Sochi, and it is a good thing that there are representatives of various political groups taking part. In my opinion, the problem with many municipal elections is that they are too uniform – people don’t have anyone to choose from and find them dull.

On the social contract and presidential Council on civil society and human rights which took place on April 15th.

Muratov: Am I right in thinking that civil society is today more important to you than a society of government officials?

Medvedev: You know - civil society is something that we still haven’t entirely learned how to comprehend properly in Russia […]. But gradually we are beginning to understand that civil society is an integral social institution of any state. It is a feed-back institution; organisations of people who do not have a post in government or in the civil service, but who actively participate in the life of the country. […] I’d like to point out: such relations [between state and civil society] are never simple for any government. This is because civil society and representatives of human-rights organisations have many bones to pick with the state and the government. They want to ask a lot of questions; and one doesn’t always want to have to answer them. And this is precisely why such an exchange should be of an official nature - this is the aim of the Council. I am expecting that the discussion will be most interesting. Obviously, it will be tough. But this is precisely why it is important.

On the new law requiring civil servants and members of the government to declare their income.

Muratov: It has not really been made clear who it is that will be checking these declarations for their authenticity. It seems that over the past few days in Russia a powerful community of “impoverished” husbands with very affluent wives has appeared…

Medvedev: You know, the task of controlling the bureaucracy and government officials is one of the fundamental tasks of any state. We started doing this quite a long time ago and I can’t really say that we have had much success. Although if you were to compare with the situation in the 1990s and the situation today, I most definitely think that there has been an improvement. […] In my opinion, the main problem today is not the lack of normative acts on control, but lack of rigorous implementation of these acts. This is, of course, where the difficulty lies - because bureaucrats are never very satisfied when they are obliged to control themselves. However, these procedures must be followed despite the fact that no-one likes controlling themselves, no-one likes confining themselves within strict frameworks; they must be followed because this is what distinguishes a civilised society from an uncivilised one – a civilised society doesn’t like it, but it has learnt to do so all the same.

[…]

Muratov: Have you personally felt a negative reaction from bureaucrats? Or have they been understanding over your decision to enforce the publication of their declaration of income?

Medvedev: Well, you know, the post of president frees one of having to hear the negative reaction of bureaucrats. I made this decision – and everyone else has to carry it out.

On the independency of the judiciary and the Khordokovskii affair.

Muratov: I’d like to ask you about the second YUKOS trial. Did you find its outcome predictable? The outcome of the first trial, for anyone who took an interest in it, was, alas, rather predictable. Someone wrote in to me and said: perhaps in the beginning Medvedev is just going to ring up the courts, including that involved in the YUKOs trial and say “you’re independent, you’re independent, let me remind you, you’re independent, you’re independent, you’re independent! "And that will be a manual kick-start for the restoration of the judiciary system.

Medvedev: I can tell you now, that any manual kick-start is very costly and I’m not just talking about the courts system here. It is simply necessary to strive towards a state machine that works in a rational way automatically. [As for the YUKOs trial] perhaps the outcome of one or another trial someone found predictable. This is the freedom and the luckiness of a person who does not have state obligations.
[…]
However, whilst for everyone else, it’s a personal matter, it would be illegal for the president to find a court’s decision predictable. It would be a sign that the law has been broken. For civil servants and for the president there is not and should not be any inkling whatsoever of predictability of the outcome of any trial, and this includes the YUKOs trial.

On the regional authorities… and rumours

Muratov: In the city of Maiskii in Kabardino-Balkaria a rumour was doing the rounds that President Medvedev was soon coming to visit, since Medvedev’s grandmother lives somewhere in the region. And what did the local authorities do when they couldn’t find the said grandmother? Just in case, they re-laid all the roads in Maiskii; cleared out tonnes of rubbish; paved the main square; put up streetlamps; everyone was happy. Why don’t we spread rumours that Medvedev’s, Surkov’s or some other government ministers’ grandmothers live in various towns throughout Russia and perhaps the fear would make more local authorities come to their senses.

Medvedev: That’s quite a good technique… I can see what’s happened here. Once, in Maiskii, if I’m not mistaken, my grandfather worked as regional party secretary. This was 60 years ago however, but perhaps that’s where they’ve got it from.

On democracy in Russia.

Muratov: Today you’ve spoken about the elections, about control over bureaucrats, about the internet. Does this mean that President Medvedev is planning to rehabilitate democracy in Russia?

Medvedev: You know, I think that democracy in its own right is in no need for any kind of rehabilitation. Democracy is a historical notion and at the same time a wholly supranational one. Therefore democracy is not in need of rehabilitation anywhere. It’s another matter that for many of our citizens the very difficult political and, more importantly, economic upheavals of the 1990s at some point fused with the arrival of the first fundamental democratic institutes in our country. For these citizens these times were extremely difficult and this made a scar on their understanding of democracy. But this is just through personal experience, rather than their understanding of democratic institutions as a whole. Therefore I do not believe that we need to rehabilitate democracy. Democracy has been, is, and will continue to be.

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Successes of a Managed Democracy

Artwork: Konstantin Latyshev "GDP doubled"

Below are two articles that were published over the past fortnight, providing quite contradictory evaluations of the current political and economic situation in Russia today. The first is an editorial published in this week’s edition of “Expert”, a political economic magazine sympathetic to the Kremlin. It expresses the official line concerning events of Medvedev’s first year as President. The second article, also an editorial, was published a fortnight ago in “Nezavisimaia Gazeta” and casts any evaluation of Putin’s first year as Prime Minister in a rather different light.

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- Expert -
A Test of Stability

When Dmitri Medvedev won the presidential election on the 2nd March 2008, no one would have guessed how difficult his presidential term was to become. It looked like Medvedev would slowly yet surely continue the excellent developments initiated by Vladimir Putin, and set about fine-tuning those spheres, where noticeable results might have for whatever reason not been achieved.

In a pre-election speech in Krasnoyarsk, Dmitri Medvedev outlined some of his priorities: a significant degree of independence of the judicial system; completion of changes to administrative regulations; handing over certain government functions to the private sector. The main assertion of his speech sounded almost like an aphorism: “Freedom is better than non-freedom.” The plan for the economy was to lessen the tax burden and place the emphasis on “building an independent, powerful, yet open financial system.”

Life, however, made a few amendments of its own. Medvedev did not get an easy ride and he, just like Putin before him, had to first win a war in the Caucasus. The peace-enforcement mission in Georgia showed that Medvedev was a tough politician, capable of making difficult decisions, whilst the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement demonstrated his ability to succeed in rather precise diplomatic manoeuvres.

It was an unpleasant surprise for Moscow’s Western partners when Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet this was absolutely necessary in order to remove the threat to the republics of another attempt to end the dispute by force; an attempt that Tbilisi deemed inevitable after having lost the first war in August. The recognition of independence showed that Moscow is capable not only of reacting on the actions of its adversaries, but also of playing a deterring role. The Kremlin’s next step was to make yet another proposition to the US, EU and NATO about starting work on a new system of security for Europe, which would also take into account Russia’s interests. It is indeed rather showing that after the war our Western colleagues turned out to be much more susceptible to Moscow’s initiatives.

The ensuing economic crisis turned out to be an even bigger problem. A drop in the price of raw-material exports and a drain on capital subjected the Russian economy to a great shock. The rouble had to be devalued by almost a third, and cash reserves dropped by 36% (216 billion dollars). The events showed that the president was entirely right in his intentions to develop the country’s financial system, but that the crisis would make realising such plans significantly more difficult.

Political reforms were of utmost importance during Medvedev’s first year as president. The initiative to extend the presidential term to 6 years and the term for Duma deputies to 5 years was the proposition that attracted the most attention within society. However, under the current arrangement of the political system extending the terms would not have brought about any large changes, although it would have had a significant stabilising effect. Perhaps up until just a few months ago it seemed that there was even too much stability in Russia, so much, in fact, that reforms were unnecessary. However, as recent events have shown, such a backup plan would not have been for nothing.

The most significant changes with regards to the development of democratic procedures are those made to the appointment of regional governors (now only parties that have won in the regional elections will be allowed to present candidates), and also the changes to the procedure of forming the Federative Council (members will be chosen from elected deputies of the regional legislative assemblies). Additionally, moves have been made to encourage involvement of smaller parties in parliamentary affairs – those who did not obtain the minimum amount of votes, but received between 5 and 7 percent will now be represented. All in all, these steps should facilitate the development of a party system – all within the course that has been set out to make the transition towards a proportional election system.

Finally, we must also recognise the successful Medvedev – Putin duumvirate. The numerous speculations on the supposed division between the two leaders have remained for the time being just that – speculation. It is obvious, that however politically different Putin and Medvedev may be - they are two different people, and this will always result in differences in their views and approaches. But the differences are not that great.

Playing on disagreements between the president and prime minister it is a game that bureaucratic clans like to play; clans that see the existence of two decision-making centres as giving them the opportunity of attaining their own egoistic goals. And it is this game that during the global economic crisis Russia’s foes abroad would also very much like to play.
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- Nezavisimaia Gazeta -
The limits of the usefulness of “managed democracy”
Legislators are scared of asking the executive inconvenient questions

The state Duma (lower house of parliament) took three weeks to mull over the first report appraising the government under the leadership of Vladimir Putin’s “Edinaia Rossiia” (United Russia). On the 30th January an evaluation report undertaken by the ministerial cabinet and carried out as part of a presidential initiative was presented to the Duma by first deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. The result of the long reflection by parliamentarians on the content of this report was a ten page resolution.

The idea was that the state Duma would give a much needed evaluation of the anti-crisis policies of the government. There would be the opportunity to ask as many questions as needed during the meeting with the cabinet ministers. Then the Duma would take the report to bits and examine the Igor Shuvalov’s answers. This would be followed by an appraisal of the effectiveness with which measures that had been undertaken by the government. The plan was to then name those deemed guilty for the failure of any of the initiatives, whilst assigning certain figures the task of carrying out any urgent measures necessary to put the system to right.

However, the deputies did not set about asking difficult questions. The resolution that ensued confirmed the position of the parliamentary majority (United Russia): not one mistake committed by the ministerial cabinet was noted. Deputies got around the trickiest bit in their relations with the government with amazing simplicity. In order to answer the question “who’s guilty?”, whilst at the same time taking their own leader out of the equation, they thought up complex turns of phrase, with the only thing eventually criticised being the wholly abstract “insufficiently high level of discipline in many federal organs of executive power, resulting in bogging down of the timescale of carrying out the President and Prime Minister’s orders”.

And that was the end of the critical section of the Duma’s resolution. What followed were a series of requests made to the executive. Among them is the wholly astonishing remark expressing the need to organise and set up a government programme to encourage the unemployed to undertake work in the social sphere. That is, instead of demanding the government (and themselves for that matter) why on earth, a full half year into the crisis, such programmes do not already exist, deputies preferred to simply meekly express the desire of creating them. They did not even dare to mention the timeframe or name those who would be involved in their implementation.

It seems the deputies’ attitude can be summed up by the age-old saying “good Tsar, bad boyars”. It’s true, that there are now in fact two Tsars, but this is not important for state Duma deputies. It is much more important that the party leader receives the same respect as the president. However, the situation is not quite as amusing as it may seem.

Firstly, such a process devalues the very idea of an evaluation – what was the point of going to such trouble to produce a report just to end up making some insignificant suggestions to some insignificant people? Secondly, this trivialises the workings of the Duma. Tax-payers provide 5.5 billion roubles a year to keep the lower house of parliament running in the hope that its deputies will stand up for their interests, regardless of who they have to confront. Meanwhile, the majority of representatives are worried about only one thing - how to find sufficiently pleasant and inoffensive turns of phrase to describe the difficult relationship between the legislative and executive.

The problem is not just the declarational character of the Russian parliament. The problem is the removal from the political arena of one of the most important mechanisms of democratic control over the executive. It is necessary to have a real division of power not only on the surface, but in reality too. It has a practical use – improving the country’s anti-crisis programmes.

When times are tough, the natural limitations of a regime that calls itself “managed democracy” become plain to see. Sooner or later however the danger will arise that there will be no-one in this “democracy” left to govern.

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Protest, what protest?

Photo: Andrey Kremenchuk
Everybody in Russia loves their government; the Kremlin enjoys universal support, as all citizens rejoice that their authorities are working together to ensure a bright and prosperous common future. Right? Of course not, although you’d be forgiven for believing that, if your only source of news was the state-owned media.

A couple of weeks ago the Russian government announced plans to raise customs duties on imported cars, in a protectionist move to defend the struggling Russian auto industry. The decision, which many say will have a direct and negative impact on their income, caused uproar in cities throughout Russia, although noticeably in Vladivostok, where hundreds of people turned up bearing banners saying ‘No to import duties.’

What’s interesting here is not the fact that the government has decided to raise import duties - I’m not an economist and I couldn’t say whether the raised taxes are a good or bad thing. What caught my attention was the way the incident was dealt with in the media; whilst the protests were covered by a few independent papers, not a word was breathed about it on Pervy Kanal, the main state channel, and coverage of the protests in most other papers and on other channels was patchy, at best.

Particularly telling was how the incident was reported in Rossiskaya Gazeta, the official state paper, in which state proclamations and new laws are announced. On 9th December the paper announced the government’s plans and then… everything fell silent. Despite people protesting across Russia, the editorial of RG saw no need to mention the disturbances. A few days later readers were told about demonstrations in support of the new duties, and were assured that, despite a global crisis, the Russian car-production industry remains the strongest in the world. But what of the protesters? Eventually their activities were recognised, when RG reported that grievances against the new taxes would be registered by federal agencies. Nevertheless, the way in which we were told about these protesters suggested that they were a minority, almost extremist group, whose protests should not be of universal concern.

This tactic of turning a blind eye to anything unpleasant is symptomatic of how much of the Russian media deals with anti-Kremlin protests. Rather than risk offending the Kremlin, it’s easier just to sweep everything under the carpet and not mention it all. But what opportunity does that allow for the expression of oppositionist ideas?

At the same that people were protesting the increased duties, a series of opposition marches expressing discontent with Russia's general economic and political situation were taking place across Russia. 15th December saw marches in 30 cities across Russia, organised by opposition political parties. The marches, however, didn't have an opportunity to take off, and were quickly broken up by the riot police, with participants being detained or whisked off into waiting trucks. Again, these riots were barely noted in the media. If its not reported, it didn't happen. And in a country as big as Russia, by not giving something adequate reportage you allow it to become an isolated event, effectively preventing further discussion on a topic.

As I was following all this, I was interested to come across an article in the St. Petersburg Courier, a free Petersburg weekly, which addressed media coverage of popular demonstrations. The author, Maria Shilova, noted the absence of media coverage of the anti-import and non-agreement marches, remarking how such protests provide the sole arena for citizens to express non-conformist opinions or a place to express constructive criticism. However, as the breaking up of the opposition marches illustrates, as a democratic pressure valve such marches are far from ideal: any attempts to express discontent will be immediately cracked down on. Shilova ended her article with the following question: And, if you’ll forgive me asking, how will the authorities know what they need to do, if we don’t have an arena for legal Constitutional marches and meetings? If we don't have freedom of speech, social discussions and transparency of information? If the authorities don't have to answer for their actions?

I can’t think of a better way to express the problems Russia faces if it really wants to develop the mechanisms necessary to create a solid civil society. If the country can't even recognise a plurality of opinions by reporting protest, then how can it ever hope to have a truly representative democratic society?

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